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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1996 the state of Nevada has been buffeted by a dramatic rise in
construction defect litigation.1 In Clark County, which includes the greater Las
Vegas area, there were nearly 170 construction defect lawsuits filed between
2000 and 2001.2 This surge of legal activity has triggered a number of
profound economic consequences for the county and the state. Proponents of
the homebuilding industry, who vigorously oppose the litigation, argue that one
outcome has been a dramatic increase in insurance costs, estimated at a 500
percent increase between 1999 and 2003,' due to rising outlays for premiums
and fewer choices of carriers.4 According to Jim Wadhams, general counsel
for the Southern Nevada Home Builders Association, the Las Vegas Valley
formerly had eight standard insurers issuing residential policies. Yet by 2002,
the Valley only had three.' Moreover, partially in response to the cost of insur-
* Ernst Lied Professor of Legal Studies, College of Business, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. J.D., Loyola University, 1982. I wish to thank both Ms. Christina Hixson for her
unwavering support of real estate education and research at UNLV, as well as UNLV for
granting me a sabbatical leave for the fall 2004 year to pursue writing and research on this
and other projects.
1 Michael M. Edwards et al., A Defense Perspective to Construction Defect Litigation and
the Upcoming Legislative Session, NEV. LAW., Jan. 2001, at 30.
2 Robert Gavin, Home Builders Face Insurance Woes, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B7.
3 Min. of Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary for May 8, 2003: Hearing on S.B. 241 Before the
Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2003 Leg. 72d Sess. Ex. E. Construction Defect Litigation and
the Residential Housing Market (citing HOMEBUILDERS RESEARCH, INC. 2003) (hereinafter
"Min. Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary"); see also Conference, The Law and Politics of Tort
Reform Justice and Democracy Forum, 4 NEV. L.J. 377, 385 (2003/2004) (hereinafter
"Politics of Tort Reform") in which speaker Steve Hill, Chairman of the Coalition for Fair-
ness in Housing Construction and President of Silver State Materials, claimed that there has
been as much as a 1600 percent increase for the cost of insurance for subcontractors in the
construction business.
4 Edwards et al., supra note 1, at 30.
1 Gavin, supra note 2, at B7. Wadhams, in a later interview in a May 2003 Las Vegas Sun
article, stated further that there was once 15 licensed construction liability insurers in
Nevada, but now none are left selling insurance in the state. Contractors must buy their
insurance from out-of-state or offshore companies, which he argues, "offer those contractors
little protection if the insurers go out of business." See Steve Kanigher, Builders Hammer
Away for Changes in Defect Law, LAS VEGAS SUN, May 4, 2003, at ID, 5D.
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ance the number of builders, defined as those who build ten or more homes,
plummeted from 157 to 110 between the years 1996 and 2001.6
Nevada is not alone in coping with insurance increases for homebuilders.7
In a number of other western and Sunbelt states, such as California, Colorado
and Florida, lawsuits have forced many insurance providers out of business and
many builders have turned to secondary or relatively unregulated insurers.8
The latter typically charge more, but provide less coverage. 9 Other builders are
simply freezing their activities. 10 All of this has caused housing shortages in
some parts of the country and likely increased the price of homes."
Property owners, on the other hand, have argued that the increase in law-
suits is attributable in part to "[p]oor supervision by the developer or general
contractor; improper sequencing of the trades and shoddy work by subcontrac-
tors; ... 2 They maintain that if builders really did wish to avoid the perils
of litigation, they should correct these systemic industry problems.13 Exactly
what factors and to what extent these and other causes may have contributed to
the explosion of claims for construction defects invites an objective inquiry.
Part II of this article explores the historical and legal roots of construction
defect litigation in Nevada. Part III presents a discussion, both pro and con, of
Nevada's latest construction defect statute by various experts about how it and
other recent construction defect statutes in neighboring states may fare in the
6 Min. Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, supra note 3.
7 Robert Aalberts, Will California's New "Fix It" Law Cure the Rash of Construction
Defect Litigation? 32 REAL EST. L. J. 335, 335 (2004).
s Gavin, supra note 2, at B7.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Andree J.B. Swanson, Las Vegas: Boom Town for Construction Defect Litigation, NEV.
LAW., Dec. 1997, at 15, 18. The Las Vegas popular press has offered local "horror stories"
by homeowners who have allegedly been victimized by faulty construction. See Kanigher,
supra note 5, at ID. "Hulet said 'his year-old $300,000 home has major structural defects.'
He said, 'a gap between the foundation of his house and the soil has caused one comer of the
residence to sink nearly four inches.' He also said, 'inch-wide cracks running four to five
feet in length cover some of his walls and that he has windows that don't fit frames or close
properly."' Id.at 1D, 5D. See also Politics of Tort Reform, supra note 3, in which another
victim of shoddy construction related his experience with local builders. "The experts that
went into our complex found, for example, that cardboard boxes had been used as construc-
tion materials in what were supposedly waterproof areas of our complex. They found that
the roof had not been constructed properly. The air conditioners were up on the roof had not
been structurally designed to hold the weight of the air conditioners. Every time someone
turned the air conditioner on and there was vibration, it was ripping apart the plywood or
cardboard that was used to construct the roof. The tiles that were used to construct the roof
weren't up to code and any time anybody stepped on them, they just shattered." Id. at 382
(relating the experiences of homeowner William J. Robinson).
13 The issue of defectively built homes has stirred the passions of the labor unions as well as
those who argue that home construction defects can also be attributed to builders using
unskilled labor in the Las Vegas Valley. See David Hare, Domestic Abuse: Unions Rally
Against Local Home Builders, LAS VEGAS CITY LIFE, Oct. 1, 2003, at http://www.lasvegas
citylife.com/articles/2003/10/01/local-news/news03homes.txt. As one of the union consul-
tants, John Wilson, commented "[t]here are about 20,000 residential construction workers in
Las Vegas .... Only a small portion of them are state-approved or qualified to be working."
Id.
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future. Part III also explores the economic loss doctrine and its future role in
construction defect litigation. This statute, in effect since 2003, will hopefully
take the state in the right direction for addressing the state's construction defect
litigation problem.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ROOTS OF CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LITIGATION
IN NEVADA
A. The Arrival of California Construction Defect Lawyers
Some observers claim that at least part of the state's rising numbers of
construction defect lawsuits is due to the arrival of large numbers of construc-
tion defect attorneys from California. As one local attorney candidly noted in a
1997 feature article in the state's bar journal, Nevada Lawyer, "[mietroplitan
Las Vegas is the pot of gold at the end of California's rainbow."14 Indeed, with
unprecedented growth, a population estimated to rise to 2 million by 2007, and
fifty-five new houses being constructed daily, the Las Vegas Valley in the
1990s was viewed by California construction defect lawyers as a lawyer's
equivalent to Eureka. 5 Paul Scofield, a former Californian and trial attorney
for homeowners explained in a 1997 article:
[tihe construction defect market in California is drying up. Many California's law-
yers are moving here. A majority of the firms in Las Vegas practicing in construction
defect law were previously based in California. The reasons are obvious: there are
few cases to be had in San Diego, and the construction defect market in other South-
ern California cities is very limited.
16
B. Builders' Reluctance to Cure Defects
The increase in construction defect litigation can also be attributed to
problems caused by the contractors themselves. In the mid-1990s, buyers of
new homes discovered that some contractors were uncooperative when asked to
repair defects in homes they sold.17 Those owners who were financially able to
survive the typically expensive and drawn out litigation process, resorted to
lawsuits. 8 Developers, perhaps predictably, complained that many of the suits
14 Swanson, supra note 12, at 16.
15 Id.
16 Id. See also infra text accompanying note 46 (discussing the solicitation of Nevada
homeowners by California construction defect lawyers).
11 James Beasley, Calloway and NRS 40.600: Two Sides of the Same Coin, NEv. LAW., Feb.
2001, at 10. See also Kanigher, supra note 5, at 5D. "Despite these [construction] problems
he [homeowner Paul Hulet] hasn't heard from the builder in nearly three months. He said he
is getting ready to file a lawsuit." Id. See also Politics of Tort Reform, supra note 3. "So we
went through the destructive testing. When the defense came in you'd have two subcontrac-
tors there with their own experts, and many a time I was treated to the two defense experts
sitting there arguing, one saying 'This can be fixed,' and the other saying, 'No, we can't fix
it. We can do it differently.' They were up in my attic doing this. I was hearing these
diametrically opposed arguments about whether the problem could be fixed or whether the
entire complex needed to be replaced. Fortunately, it turned out they could fix what was
wrong with my house. But it was an unbelievable pain." Id. at 382 (relating the experiences
of homeowner William Robinson).
I8 Beasley, supra note 17, at 11.
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were nuisance lawsuits being fought over minor defects.19 Of course, the costs
of litigation and the negative publicity further added to the builders' resentment
over the lawsuits.2° These kinds of problems pressed both the Southern
Nevada Home Builders and the Nevada Trial Lawyers to seek legislation to
address the problems. 2 The result was the passage of Senate Bill 395 (Chapter
40-1995), and the establishment of Nevada's first construction defect law.22
C. Nevada's 1995 Construction Defect Statute
Nevada's construction defect statute became law in July 1995. It was
intended to signal a compromise between the competing interests of homeown-
ers and homebuilders. As one experienced Las Vegas construction defects law-
yer observed shortly after its passage:
[Chapter 40-1995's] clear purpose is to give the homeowner and contractor a rela-
tively brief window of opportunity to investigate and settle construction defect cases
before they blossom into full-blown, heels-dug-in-litigation. There's plenty of carrot
and stick in the new law as it clearly has broadened homeowner rights, but only after
they traverse hurdles designed to make available cheaper and faster alternatives to
litigation.
23
The statute, with an important exception pertaining to housing com-
24plexes, generally worked in the following manner. To remedy a construction
defect problem, a homeowner drew up a complaint in reasonable detail and
notified the contractor by certified mail within sixty days that his property con-
tained a construction defect.25 A construction defect was broadly defined as a
defect".., in the design, construction, manufacture, repair or landscaping of a
new residence, of an alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or of an
appurtenance."2 6 The contractor could respond within sixty days to the home-
owner's notice with a written settlement offer that could either include compen-
sation or an offer to repair the defect at the contractor's expense.2 7 If the offer
to repair was accepted it was to be completed within forty-five days. 8 The
contractor could also offer to repurchase the property. 9 If a claimant unrea-
sonably rejected a settlement offer the court could later deny him attorney's
19 Id.
20 id.
21 id.
22 NEV. REv. STAT. 40.600-695 (1995).
23 Lynde Selden, H, SB 395 - The New Nevada Construction Defect Statute: Changes in
Form and Substance, NEV. LAW., Nov. 1995, at 18, 18.
24 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.613 (1995). "Complex matter" means a claim: (1) In which the
claimant is a representative of a homeowner's association that is responsible for a residence
or for an appurtenance and is acting within the scope of his duties pursuant to chapter 116 or
117 of NRS; or (2) That involves five or more separate residences at the time the action is
commenced or at any time during the subsequent action. In a complex matter, the claimant
did not have to give notice first. See NEV. REV. STAT. 40.682(1) (1995). "Notwithstanding
the provisions of subsection 1 of NRS 40.680, a claimant may commence an action in dis-
trict court in a complex matter." Id.
25 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.645(1).
26 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.615.
27 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.645(3)(c)(1-3).
28 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.645(3)(c)(3).
29 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.665.
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fees and costs as well as force him to pay the contractor's attorney's fees and
costs. 30 A contractor who failed to make a reasonable offer, respond in good
faith, failed to repair the defect adequately, or agree to or participate in media-
tion3 1 would lose the limitations and defenses to liability provided in Chapter
40.32 If a voluntary settlement could not be reached on non-complex matters,
the parties would submit their dispute to mediation.33
If a homeowner exhausted these procedural remedies, he could then com-
mence a lawsuit. Still, the statute limited damages to the following:
reasonable attorney's fees;
costs of repairs and costs to relocate while repairs were being made;
lost value of the property due to structural failure;
reasonable value of any property damaged by the constructional defect;
cost of experts;
interest provided by statute.
34
While Nevada's new construction defect statute sought to satisfy the con-
flicting interests of homeowners and homebuilders by providing both a forum
and a fair remedy, the discontent did not subside. If anything, the litigation
appeared to accelerate because Chapter 40-1995 failed to properly address the
many problems caused by construction defects. 35 Litigation also erupted over
how to interpret Chapter 40-1995. In general, the legal problems stemmed from
two sources. The first source of confusion was the holding in Calloway v. City
of Reno 36 (Calloway H), a case predating Chapter 40-1995. The second was
the "complex matter" exception created in the statute for construction defects
arising in housing complexes.
37
D. The "Complex Matter" Exception
Chapter 40-1995 provided a very important exception to the requirement
that homeowners first give notice to homebuilders to cure alleged construction
defects.38 While the homebuilders initially supported the complex matter
exception, they have now acknowledged it was a serious error in judgment. In
reality, the complex matter exception only added to the rash of litigation, par-
ticularly class action suits.39
30 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.650(l)(a)(b).
31 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.650(2)(a-e).
32 NEV. REv. STAT. 40.650(e).
33 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.680.
34 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.655(1)(a-g).
35 According to testimony made to the Committee on Judiciary regarding construction
defect litigation and the proposed Senate Bill (SB) 241, Chapter 40-1995 was a failed law
that produced many problems including declining property values, increases in construction
costs, the delay and denial of repairs and injuries to both homeowners and contractors. See
Min. of the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, supra note 3, at Ex. G.
36 Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 2000) (hereinafter "Calloway H").
37 See supra text accompanying note 24.
38 See supra text accompanying notes 24-34 discussing in general the pre-litigation proce-
dures for non-complex matters.
39 See Kanigher, supra note 5, at 5D.
Southern Nevada home builders said litigation didn't become much of a problem for them until
after the 1999 amendment that allowed the "complex matter" cases involving at least five homes
to result in immediate lawsuits. Builder representatives testified before the Legislature at the
[Vol. 5:684
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Chapter 40-1995 defined a "complex matter" as a claim that originated
from a representative of a homeowner's association or that "involves five or
more separate residences at the time the action is commenced."4 ° The provi-
sion covered planned unit developments (PUD) and condominiums, both of
which have and are currently being built extensively throughout the Las Vegas
Valley. Complex matters were exempt from the notice and right-to-repair
requirements.4 1 Under non-complex cases, such as single-family housing,
however, claimants still had to give contractors the right-to-repair.
4 2
The method for initiating complex matters under Chapter 40-1995 was
governed by chapter 40, section 682 of Nevada Revised Statutes.43 The provi-
sion stated that claimants: could file an action directly in district court without
first informing the builder.' It also provided ground rules for the exchange of
information, bringing additional parties into the suit, voluntary mediation,
selection of a special master and other procedures meant to expedite the
process.45
According to some in the building industry, the complex matter exception
afforded construction defect litigants both a greater bargaining position and a
potential for recovering more in damages. This was particularly true of class
action suits, often initiated at the behest of homeowner's association who may
have been encouraged to sue by lawyers seeking their business.4 6 Moreover,
time that because they figured they were going to get sued anyway it was best to have such cases
go through the referee process provided by the courts as soon as possible. Las Vegas building
supplier Steve Hill, chairman of a coalition of builders and developers that supports SB 241, said
the industry now realizes that the amendment was a big mistake for them because it resulted in a
flood of class-action lawsuits. "The industry did not anticipate abuse of that law," Hill said. The
industry played a role in trying to improve that law. We just didn't know what kind of loophole
that would turn out to be.
Id. Another viewpoint on why homebuilders supported the complex matters exception
comes from Scott K. Canepa, an attorney who has represented homeowners. Canepa main-
tains that homebuilders asked the Legislature for the exception because "[b]uilders claimed
their insurance companies were not acknowledging a pre-lawsuit Chapter 40 notice as trig-
gering their legal duty to defend and/or pay claims." Scott K. Canepa, Should Construction-
Defect Laws be Overhauled? LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 5, 2003, at 1D.
40 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.613.
41 See supra text accompanying notes 24-34.
42 Id.
43 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.682.
4" Id. "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1 of NRS 40.680, a claimant may com-
mence an action in district court in a complex matter." NEV. REV. STAT. 40.682(1).
45 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. 40.680.
46 See supra discussion in note 39. See also Min. of Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, supra
note 3, at Ex. K. For example, Deanna Forbush testified to a legislative committee regarding
class action suits by homeowner's association:
I am an attorney here in Las Vegas and am appearing as a private citizen today in support of
Senate Bill 241. About a year and a half ago, a construction defect attorney solicited my former
neighbors and me for legal work and asked that we complete a survey identifying defects in our
homes. The solicitation was sent in the form of a letter addressed to the homeowner's associa-
tion and was printed on the letterhead of a firm based in California. The letter had also listed this
firm's website as www.constructiondefects.com.
Id. at 59. She further testified that "[ilt seems clear that a few of these out-of-state lawyers
are simply trolling homeowners associations to generate legal business for their out-of-town
firm while leaving the practice of law in general in disrepute." Id.
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construction defect litigation typically takes a long time and is very expen-
sive.47 A defense of the suit all the way to trial incurred costs and burdens on
all the parties possibly greater than the trouble and cost of settlement.48
Accordingly, insurance companies often found it prudent to settle before trial.
Since claims for construction defects in complex matters could be commenced
in court, it is likely that the exception was directly responsible for not only
some of the increased amount of construction defect litigation in Nevada, but
for the insurance increases as well. 50
Still, the complex matters exception, as mentioned, had not been the only
apparent reason why construction defect litigation is commonplace in Nevada.
The case of Calloway 15 also added uncertainty and perhaps may have
emboldened those asserting construction defect claims.
E. The Calloway II Case and the Construction Defect Statute: Confusion
and Confrontation
Some of the confusion and contentiousness surrounding construction
defect litigation in Nevada had also been caused by the holding in Calloway II
and subsequent attempts by lawyers representing aggrieved homeowners to
limit its effect by exploiting certain ambiguous provisions found in the Chapter
40-1995 construction defect statute. To understand fully the impact of this
case, it is necessary to briefly trace the Nevada case law leading up to Calloway
H.
4 See John Boyden, Chapter 40 and Construction Defect Litigation - Boom or Bust? NEV.
LAW., Jan. 2002, at 10. Boyden discusses, in particular, the high cost of experts who con-
duct lengthy inspections of the alleged defective conditions. Homeowners could recover the
cost of experts under Chapter 40-1995. See supra text accompanying note 34 for discussion
of the damages that can be awarded to a plaintiff.
48 See, e.g., Politics of Tort Reform, supra note 3.
To start with, as I said, homes do not get fixed once they get into these complex cases, which are
either cases brought by associations or by five or more individual homeowners. NTLA [the
Nevada Trial Lawyers Association] distributed a list to the Governor-appointed Construction
Liability Insurance Task Force, of which I was the chair, illustrating 120 complex cases in which
no repairs were made to as a result of the lawsuits. Settlements happened later, but those cases
dragged on for years.
Id. at 385-86 (relating the experiences of Steve Hill).
49 Hubble Smith, Falling Between the Cracks, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 2, 2003, at 1E.
'These insurance companies, they have their own lawyers and experts. 'They go out and see
these problems firsthand. When they go out and see these are not trumped-up charges, they
start laying out millions because they know if they go to trial, they're going to lose nine
times out of 10."' Id. at 4E (quoting attorney Thomas Miller).
50 See Politics of Tort Reform, supra note 3.
As a result [of complex matter cases] insurance has become ridiculously expensive. Our num-
bers show upwards of 1,600 % increases, predominately for subcontractors that work in the
construction industry. The increase averaged between 500-600% over the last several years.
Insurance companies have suffered financially. They are not really building [the loss] into their
rates, but they have a smaller pool of funds available to commit to markets. When they look at
the construction liability market in Nevada, they see a terrible risk profile. They see that they are
going to be sued if they write insurance here, regardless of whether the subcontractor involved
does a good job of building or not.
Id. at 386 (observations of Steve Hill, Chairman of the Coalition for Fairness in Housing and
President of Silver State Materials).
51 Calloway II, 993 P.2d at 1259.
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The genesis of the controversy is the adoption of the so-called "economic
loss doctrine" in Nevada's products liability law. The economic loss doctrine
was created in order to distinguish remedies afforded in contract from those
recoverable in tort. As the Nevada Supreme Court stated in Calloway H "[t]he
economic loss doctrine marks the fundamental boundary between contract law
which is designed to enforce the expectancy interest of the parties, and tort law,
which imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby encourages citizens to
avoid causing physical harm to others."52 The court further stated that
[u]nder the economic loss doctrine "there cannot be recovery in tort for purely eco-
nomic losses." Purely economic loss is generally defined as "the loss of the benefit
of the user's bargain ... including ... pecuniary damage for inadequate value, the
cost of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits,
without any claim of personal injury or damage to other property." 53
Contract remedies are generally less than what can be recovered in tort.54
This difference in the amount of potential recovery increased the stakes in this
heated controversy. As explained by Keeton, contract damages "are limited to
those within the contemplation of the defendant at the time the contract is
made, and in some jurisdictions, at least, to those for which the defendant has
tacitly agreed to assume responsibility. They may be further limited by the
contract itself, where a tort action might avoid the limitations."55 In respect to
tort, however, the commentators explain that "[i]n the tort action the only limi-
tations are those of 'proximate cause,' and the policy which denies recovery to
certain types of interests themselves."56 As the Calloway H court further points
out, "[p]ermitting plaintiffs to recover in tort for purely economic losses would
result in open-ended liability, since it is virtually impossible to predict all the
economic consequences of a given act."57
Unfortunately, the rule has created confusion in products liability practice
over the true meaning of the doctrine. This, in turn, has caused confusion in
construction defect litigation. As one court maintains, the term "economic
loss" is a "poor choice of words - all the losses for which tort victims sue are
economic. '"58 On the other hand, drawing the distinction between recovery in
contract for purely economic losses versus remedies in tort for negligence and
strict liability can be pivotal. As the Calloway 1I court argued "if this develop-
ment [the blurring between tort and contract remedies] were allowed to pro-
52 Id. at 1263.
53 Id. (citations omitted).
5 Jeffrey Stempel, Recent Court Decisions, 68 J. RISK & INS. 519 (2001).
5 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 665 (West Publ'g Co. 5th ed.
1984).
56 Id.
51 See, Stempel, supra note 54, at 520. As Stempel explains it, in a construction defect
lawsuit in tort a victim may attempt to prove the builder was willfully indifferent to the
buyer's rights and thereby seek punitive damages. Victims may also allege that they suf-
fered mental distress and should therefore collect non-economic damages for loss of the use
of their homes while they are being repaired.
51 Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 1992).
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gress too far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort."'59 As stated above,
this can result in a significant difference in a plaintiff s recovery for damages.60
Nevada case law, moreover, has not always been consistent in adequately
delineating the boundaries between contract and tort. Starting in 1982 in Culi-
nary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Stern,6 1 the Nevada Supreme Court adopted
the economic loss rule and held that the plaintiff cannot recover in tort under
negligence or strict liability for purely economic losses. However, eight years
later in Charlie Brown Construction Co. v. City of Boulder City,62 the court
created an exception providing that if the damages were "foreseeable," then tort
recovery was possible.63 The doctrine was further eroded a year after Charlie
Brown, when the court, in National Union Fire Insurance Company v. Pratt &
Whitney, 64 held that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to construction
projects since they involve the products and efforts of many different parties,
such as laborers, manufacturers, inspectors, etc.6 5 The issue arose again in
1997 in the first Calloway v. City of Reno (Calloway 1).66 Calloway I held that
homeowners could recover in tort for damages caused to their negligently con-
structed home.6 7
The Calloway I ruling, however, was short-lived. In 1998, the court
granted a rehearing, paving the way for Calloway 11.68 As two Nevada com-
mentators, Menter and Argue, assert "[i]n Calloway II, the Nevada Supreme
Court swept away prior precedent and adopted a strict 'no exceptions' approach
to the Economic Loss Rule."69
Moreover, the Calloway 11 case clarified another important issue in con-
struction defect litigation. Can an action lie in tort when so-called defective
products in a house, such as its framing, cause damage to other property in the
house, such as the floors and ceiling? The court explained that these are all
integrated and necessary component parts of the whole.70 Hence, if one com-
ponent part, such as the defective framing, damages another part, such as the
floor, it still incurs an economic loss only unto itself. Accordingly, an action
19 Calloway 11, 993 P.2d at 1264.
60 See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
61 Culinary Workers Union Local 226 v. Stem, 651 P.2d 637 (Nev. 1982). See also Oak
Grove Investors v. Bell & Gossett Co., 668 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Nev. 1983) (in which the
Nevada Supreme Court stated in dicta that a property owner could sue in tort in a construc-
tion defect case).
62 Charlie Brown Const. Co. v. City of Boulder City, 797 P.2d 946 (Nev. 1990).
63 Id. at 953.
6 Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Pratt & Whitney, 815 P.2d 602 (Nev. 1991).
65 Id. at 603.
66 Calloway v. City of Reno, 939 P.2d 1020 (Nev. 1997), reh'g granted, 971 P.2d 1250
(Nev. 1998).
67 Id. at 1023.
68 Calloway v. City of Reno, 971 P.2d 1250 (Nev. 1998).
69 Timothy S. Menter & Matthew W. Argue, The Economic Loss Rule and Construction
Defect Litigation, NEV. LAW., Sept. 2000, at 18, 20.
70 Calloway I1, 993 P.2d at 1269. "Here, the townhouses are part of larger, integrated struc-
tures, and the framing was an integral component of these structures. The damage caused by
the allegedly defective framing therefore constituted damage to the structures themselves -
no 'other' property damage resulted, and appellants suffered purely economic losses." Id.
The Calloway I case, however, did reserve the right to use tort theories in cases involving
personal injuries or damage to property other than the defective entity itself. Id. at 1267.
[Vol. 5:684
CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LITIGATION
would lie solely in contract or warranty law, not in tort. As one commentator,
discussing the case law in Florida which has adopted the economic loss rule in
a similar manner, explains:
[w]hile tort recovery is available when a product has damaged "other property," the
legal transmutation of building materials from "goods into realty" upon incorporation
into a project effectively forestalls the argument that tort law may be invoked
because the defective product damaged the other products with which it was
installed.7 1
F. Calloway II Versus Nevada's Construction Defect Statute: Which
Governed?
While some may view Calloway 11 as the case that finally put to rest the
issue of whether tort remedies were generally recoverable for construction
defects, the issue, if anything, became more clouded. The confusion was
largely due to Nevada's 1995 construction defect statute. The Calloway II case
and the law that was applied to it predated the 1995 statute. Some of the stat-
ute's provisions were arguably inconsistent with the language of the case and it
was unclear whether the economic loss rule as created in Calloway II applied to
post-1995 construction defect cases.7 2
James Beasley, a lawyer representing the framing subcontractors in both
Calloway cases, argued that the ruling did not conflict with the 1995 statute.
Indeed, much of the controversy essentially came down to the meaning of a
number of words in several of the statute's provisions. The first was language
in chapter 40, section 635(2) of the Nevada Revised Statutes providing that the
statute shall "[p]revail over any conflicting law otherwise applicable to the
claim or cause of action. ' 73 Beasley argued this included the application of the
economic loss rule. Another argument involved the words "proximately
caused" which appeared in chapter 40, section 655 of the Nevada Revised Stat-
utes (NRS).7 4 Critics contended those words were uniquely applied to tort
law.75 A third argument was that language limiting recovery to just contract
and warranty law simply did not appear anywhere in the statute.7 6
Beasley's response relied on legislative history and other statutory lan-
guage. He pointed out that in an earlier version of Senate Bill (SB) 395, con-
tractors and their agents could be subject to a suit for "negligence. '7 7 That
word, however, was later replaced with the words "acts or omissions" which
appeared in chapter 40, section 460 of Nevada Revised Statutes. 78 Beasley
contended that if the legislature had intended to permit a suit in tort, the word
"negligence" would have been left in the statute.7 9 Moreover, he pointed to
71 H. Hugh McConnell, Diminished Capacity - Owner's Ability to Sue for Construction
Defects in Florida, FLA. BAR J., June 1997, at 64, 65-66 (citing Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n. v.
Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 S.2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993)).
72 See infra text accompanying notes 84-86.
73 NEV. REv. STAT. 40.635(2) (1995).
71 NEv. REV. STAT. 40.655 (1995).
75 Beasley, supra note 17 at 11.
76 id.
77 id.
78 id.
79 Id.
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NRS 40.635(1) which provided that the statute applied to any claim arising
after July 1, 1995 "except a claim for personal injury or wrongful death" limit-
ing a claimant to contract and warranty law.8" Beasley also dismissed the argu-
ment that "proximately caused" applies exclusively to tort law. He maintained
that "[t]he phrase is as equally applicable in tort law as it is in contract law."
81
Beasley's arguments have been refuted by at least one commentator repre-
senting the interests of claimant-homeowners. In a letter published in the April
2001 issue of the Nevada Lawyer, Robert Maddox, who represented one of the
plaintiffs in Calloway II, sought to counter Beasley's contentions.12 Maddox
relied strongly on chapter 40, section 655 of Nevada Revised Statutes, a provi-
sion that provided for a limitation on how claimants could recover for construc-
tion defects. He pointed out that chapter 40, section 655 permits a homeowner
to recover the "'cost of repair' in addition to all other costs related to the
claim."83 He also downplayed the importance of legislative history by noting
that the statute's language is clear that a homeowner's "'economic damages'
are recoverable without regard to the nature of the 'claim or cause of action.'
,,84
Maddox further argued that when the statute was enacted in 1995, tort
remedies were available under case law.85 Calloway II, which excludes tort
remedies, had not yet been decided. While the statute provided that it would
prevail over conflicting law, the tort law remedies that existed at that time were
simply not contrary to the language of the statute.86
G. Construction Defect Litigation and the Economic Loss Doctrine: A
Growing Trend or Destined to Die?
Of course, Nevada is not the only state experiencing problems from an
environment of rapid building and construction defect litigation. Other western
and Sunbelt states have similarly felt the pinch, in some cases, years before
such problems occurred in Nevada. 7 In response, some of these states also
adopted the economic loss doctrine in order to avoid tort suits in construction
defect cases.88 The Calloway II court noted that the economic loss doctrine has
been applied by courts in Arizona (in an action against a builder),89 in Illinois
(in an action against an architect),90 in Washington (in an action for negligent
80 Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. 40.635(1) (2003)).
81 Id. at 12.
82 Robert C. Maddox, Chapter 40 Preserves All Claims, NEV. LAw., Apr. 2001, at 9.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Maddox' prescience should be noted. See infra text accompanying notes 124-33,discuss-
ing Olson v. Richard, 89 P.3d 31 (Nev. 2004), in which the Nevada Supreme Court ruled
that the plaintiff could maintain an action in tort under Chapter 40-1995, despite the eco-
nomic loss doctrine enunciated in Calloway II, in a construction defect case.
86 Id.
87 See generally Aalberts, supra note 7.
88 See infra text accompanying notes 123-132 (discussing Olson, 89 P.3d 31, which ruled
that the economic loss doctrine conflicts with the language of Chapter 40-1995 and so no
longer applies in Nevada).
89 Calloway 11, 993 P.2d at 1266 (citing Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 690 P.2d 158
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)).
90 Id. (citing Lincoln Park West Condo. v. Mann, 555 N.E. 2d 346 (I11. 990)).
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construction), 9 and in Florida (in an action against a building material sup-
plier).9 2 In addition, since Calloway II, both California9 3 and Colorado9 4 have
adopted a version of the economic loss doctrine in construction defect cases.
However, the doctrine, at least in its application to construction defect litigation
in Nevada, may be dead in the wake of the 2004 case of Olson v. Richard. 
95
The doctrine may very well have met the same fate in California.96
III. NEVADA'S NEW CONSTRUCTION DEFECT STATUTE: WILL IT FIx THE
LITIGATION PROBLEMS?
Nevada's new construction defect statute, SB 241 (Chapter 40-2003) was
passed in 2003 to address the apparent deficiencies of Chapter 40-1995. 97
Indeed, instead of addressing construction defect problems, Chapter 40-1995
spawned even more litigation.9" To the extent Chapter 40-2003 is intended to
stem the rising tide of construction defect lawsuits, the statute's most important
component is the ability of contractors and subcontractors to repair or cure
construction defects before a homeowner can initiate a lawsuit.9 9 As discussed
91 Id. (citing Atherton Condo. Bd. v. Blume Dev., 799 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1990)).
92 Id. (citing Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 620 S.2d 1244 (Fla.
1993)).
93 Aas v. Superior Court of San Diego, 12 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2000).
94 Town of Alma v. Azco Constr. Inc., 10 P. 3d 1256 (Colo. 2000).
95 Olson v. Richards, 89 P.3d 31 (Nev. 2004). See infra text accompanying notes 124-33.
96 Although the Aas case, 12 P. 3d at 1125, has not been expressly overruled yet on the
issue of the economic loss doctrine, its future applicability is in serious doubt. For example,
an article in the Los Angeles Lawyer opined:
[t]he California Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Aas v. Superior Court became the impetus for
SB 800 [California's new construction defect law]. In Aas, the supreme court seemingly settled
a longstanding issue: whether developers, contractors, and their insurers were liable to home-
owners for repairs of construction defects that had not manifested damage. The court ruled that
construction defect plaintiffs were not allowed to recover damages foe economic loss when the
alleged defects had not caused property damage. The court's holding, however, was met with
derision from trial lawyers and many in the real estate industry. Many people echoed the senti-
ments of Chief Judge George, who, in dissent, asked why a homeowner should "have to wait for
a personal tragedy to occur in order to recover damage to repair known serious building code
safety defects caused by negligent construction?" In 2002, the California legislature answered
Chief Justice George's question and passed SB 800. The principal purpose of SB 800 is to
specify the rights and requirements of a homeowner seeking to bring an action for construction
defects. The bill includes applicable standards for home construction, the statute of limitations,
the burden of proof, the damages that are recoverable, applicable prelitigation procedure, and the
obligations of the homeowner. By its Purpose and Provisions, SB 800 Overrules the Aas Court's
Interpretation of What Constitutes Actionable Damage."
L.M.S. & R.P.E, In the Wake of Aas, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2003, at 40 (emphasis added).
97 Tony Illia, Right-to-Repair not Likely to Bring Insurance Rates Down, LAS VEGAS Bus.
PRESS, June 27, 2003, at 8. Chapter 40-2003 went into effect on August 1, 2003.
98 See supra parts I and II.
99 This portion of the article focuses on the claimant's duty under Chapter 40-2003 to give
notice to a contractor and afford it the chance to fix the defect before a lawsuit can be
initiated. However, there are other issues that may also arise under the new statute. For
example, NEv. REV. STAT. 40.615 (2003) defines "defect" in greater detail than the 1995
Act. This was a contentious issue in the bill's passage. See Craig Carlston, Comment,
Senate Bill 241: Reining in Nevada's Construction Defect Litigation-Fixing Homes Without
Lawsuit, available at http://nevadalawjoumal.org/pdf/sb241.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004)
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earlier, under Chapter 40-1995 if a complainant possessed a so-called "complex
case" - a claim that originated from a representative of a homeowner's associa-
tion or that involved "five or more separate residences at the time the action is
commenced"' ° - she was able to bring the case directly into state district
court. 1°' This likely was one of the primary causes of the proliferation of con-
struction defect cases after 1996.102
Under Chapter 40-2003, the homeowner must now give notice of the con-
struction defects to those allegedly responsible, including the contractor, the
subcontractor, supplier, and design professionals.' 3 These parties, in turn,
must now respond to the homeowner's allegations.1 ' The statute further pro-
vides in detail the manner in which the responsive parties should take action
after receiving the claimant's notice. For example, the contractor has ninety
days to answer the notice of defect."0 5 The responsive parties may also pro-
pose monetary compensation116 or disclaim liability, but must state the reasons
why. 107 If the responsive parties decide not to repair the construction defect,
the claimant (or the contractor seeking remedies against the other responsive
parties) is provided with a cause of action and may proceed with a lawsuit. 10 8
If the responsive parties elect to repair, however, the homeowner must give
them a "reasonable opportunity to repair the constructional defect."10 9 If the
claimants do not allow the contractor or other parties to cure the defect, but
instead commence a lawsuit first, the court shall dismiss the suit, without
prejudice, to force the claimant to comply. 1 0
(discussing the controversies over the amended definition of constructional defect in state-
ments submitted to the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, Min. Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, supra note 3). See also supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
'o NEV. REv. STAT. 40.613. See supra text accompanying notes 38-51.
101 NEv. REV. STAT. 40.613. "Complex Matter" defined, was repealed in 2003.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 38-69. See also Joe Wheeler, "Right-to-Repair"
Means Work for Contractors, CONSTRUCTION ZONE, Aug. 2003, at http://www.nvconstruc-
tionzone.comlRightTo_- Repair_August2003htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). "A major vic-
tory was that the distinction between complex cases and non-complex cases was thrown out.
In the past, any suit involving five or more homes was considered to be a complex case and
such a case jumped right into the court upon filing, with no repairs allowed. SB 241 changes
that with contractors allowed to repair defects in all cases." Id.
103 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.645. This section also provides, in detail, the manner in which the
notice should be given to these parties and the particulars that should be contained in the
notice of a defect.
104 Id.
105 NEV. REv. STAT. 40.6472. It should be noted that, under Chapter 40-2003, a responding
party, such as a contractor, may present the claim to its insurer who then must treat the claim
as a civil action. NEV. REV. STAT. 40.649. The possible benefit is that, formerly, some
contractors encouraged litigation in order to draw in their insurers. This provision eliminates
that incentive. See Kanigher, supra note 39.
1o NEV. REV. STAT. 40.6472(2)(b). See also NEV. REv. STAT. 40.650(1)(a)(b) which
imposes penalties on claimants who reject reasonable offers of settlement as well as penal-
ties on contractors and other parties who fail to the respond.to the claimant's notice of a
construction defect. See NEV. REV. STAT. 40.650(2)(a-e).
'o7 NEV. REv. STAT. 40.6472(2)(c).
108 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.6472(4).
109 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.6472(5).
I10 NEV. REv. STAT. 40.647(2)(a).
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Like Chapter 40-1995, the newest version also contains provisions to
encourage mediation."' Unlike the 1995 Act, however, the new statute also
seeks to involve the State Contractors Board. For example, a claimant or any
responding party "may submit a question or dispute to the State Contractors'
Board... concerning the need for repairs, the appropriate method for repairs,
the sufficiency of any repairs that have been made and the respective rights and
responsibilities of homeowners, claimants, contractors, subcontractors, suppli-
ers and design professionals.' 12 Although these State Contractors Board deci-
sions are not binding and subject to judicial review' 1 3 or admissible in a
judicial or administrative hearing,"' inclusion of this process in the statute was
met with controversy. Opponents, for example, felt that the Board would favor
the construction industry, while the Board itself felt that it did not have suffi-
cient resources or ability to handle the disputes. 1 5
A. Election to Repair
If the contractor or other parties choose to fix the defects, the manner in
which the repairs are to be performed is specifically laid out in the statute. For
instance, the repairs must be performed on reasonable dates and times agreed to
in advance 1 6 under applicable building codes and in a "good and workmanlike
manner in accordance with the generally accepted standard of care in the indus-
try for that type of repair.""' 7 Moreover, the repairs must be finished within
105 days of the time the contractor received the notice if four or fewer owner
were named in it,"' or 150 days if there were five or more owners" 9 with a
provision to extend the period to repair for a reasonable time if all the parties
agree. 2o
B. Olson v. Richard: The Future of the Economic Loss Doctrine in
Nevada
As discussed earlier, construction defect litigation from 1995 until the pas-
sage of the new Act in 2003 was clouded by differing legal interpretations of
how Chapter 40-1995 was impacted by the ruling in Calloway II J121 Since
Calloway II predated the passage of the 1995 Act, the court did not address
how that case squared with the statute. 122 However, in the wake of the Nevada
Supreme Court's decision in Olson v. Richard, i"3 the conflict is apparently
being laid to rest.
11' NEV. REV. STAT. 40.680.
112 NEV. REv. STAT. 40.6887(1).
113 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.6887(3)(a).
114 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.6887(3)(b).
115 Carlston, supra note 99 and text accompanying notes 52-60.
116 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.648(1)(b)(1).
117 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.648(1)(b)(2).
118 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.648(2)(a).
119 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.648(2)(b).
120 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.648(3).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 36, 52-60.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 72-86.
123 Olson v. Richard, 89 P.3d 31 (Nev. 2004)
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In Olson, decided in May 2004, James and Candance Olson sued the con-
tractor, Aztech Plastering and its owner, Thomas Richard, for construction
defects they alleged existed on their property. They advanced both theories of
contract and tort law alleging water intrusion, as well as other problems, caused
by inferior stucco applications. 124 The lawsuit was commenced in 1997 when
Chapter 40-1995 was clearly in effect. At the trial level the defendants success-
fully dismissed the negligence action, citing Calloway II, which bars such
claims under the economic loss doctrine unless there is personal injury or prop-
erty damage to property other than the structure itself.
125
However, on appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case back to the district court.12 6 The court, calling the issue one "of first
impression related to construction defects case brought under Chapter 40,"127
justified its ruling by stating that "it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature
did not intend for the economic loss doctrine to preclude a homeowner from
alleging a negligence claim in a construction defect cause of action initiated
pursuant to Chapter 40."128
The court based its reasoning on two of the 1995 statute's provisions. The
first, chapter 40, section 640 of Nevada Revised Statutes, provided that a con-
tractor would be liable for its "acts or omissions or the acts or omissions of his
agents, employees, or subcontractors" '129 which the court argued does not limit
a claimant to only contract and. warranty remedies. 30 The second statutory
provision, chapter 40, section 635(2) of Nevada Revised Statutes, stated that
Chapter 40 would preempt "any conflicting law otherwise applicable to the
claim or cause of action."1 31 However, when Chapter 40 was passed in 1995,
the court pointed out, it "was consistently reluctant to apply the economic loss
doctrine to construction defects cases. 132 The Olson case does not directly
involve Chapter 40-2003 since the lawsuit arose in 1997. Still, it is important
to note that the relevant provisions of chapter 40 - sections 640 and 635(2) -
are the same in both the 1995 and 2003 Acts, indicating that the court would
likely rule the same for cases arising under Chapter 40-2003.
124 Id. at 32.
125 Id. at 32-33.
126 Id. at 33-34.
1217 Id. at 31. Up to the time of this case, the state supreme court had not had the opportunity
to "address whether a negligence claim could be brought under Chapter 40." Id. at 33.
128 Id. at 33. As discussed earlier, the Calloway II case was decided five years after Chapter
40-1995, however, its facts predated the statute's passage. See supra text accompanying
notes 72-86.
129 NEV. REV. STAT. 40.640.
130 Olson, 89 P.3d at 33. The court based its logic on the fact if the Legislature had
intended to limit plaintiffs to just contract remedies it would have indicated so. "[T]hus, we
presume that the Legislature envisioned that Chapter 40 would provide more than just con-
tractual remedies." Id.
131 NEv. REv. STAT. 40.635(2).
132 Olson, 89 P.3d at 33. The court cited both Calloway 1, 939 P.2d at 1025, as well as Oak
Grove, 668 P.2d at 1080-81, as examples of cases in which the court was reluctant to apply
the economic loss doctrine to construction defect cases. Olson, 89 P.3d at 33 n.6. See also,
supra text accompanying notes 61-65. (discussing pre-1995 product liability cases).
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C. Nevada's Right-to-Repair Statute: Will it Work?
Since the ink on Chapter 40-2003 is barely dry, it is difficult to predict
whether it will succeed. Still, Nevada is definitely not alone in its experiment
with a right-to-repair statute. By September 2003, fifteen states had enacted
right-to-repair legislation, including Nevada's neighbors - Arizona and Califor-
nia.133 Moreover, four states had filed legislation, 134 four had considered it135
but did not ultimately pass an act, and Texas set up an alternative dispute forum
for residential contractor disputes.
136
Despite their recent origins, the right-to-repair statutes have sharply
divided the legal community. Indeed, there are no easy solutions to problems
that simultaneously affect one person's home and another's livelihood but
Chapter 40-2003 seeks to strike the proper balance. Steve Hill, president of
Silver State Materials Corporation, chair of the Coalition for Fairness in Con-
struction, and an outspoken supporter of Chapter 40-2003, sees benefits accru-
ing to all parties involved. Homeowners in complex matters, he contends, were
being "forced" into lawsuits before having the chance to have their defects
repaired, as part of an association class action suit. 137 As a result their homes
were "tainted by a lawsuit" which caused them to decline in value.138 Moreo-
ver, he argues, these lawsuits precluded homeowners from refinancing or a
buyer from receiving financing with a FHA or VA mortgage, nor would real
estate brokers normally show a home with a lawsuit pending on it.
139
Some feel that Chapter 40-2003 will also begin to bring down the spiraling
costs of insurance for contractors and subcontractors. Nevada's Insurance
Commissioner, Alice Molasky-Arman, in an address at the West Coast Casu-
alty's Construction Defect Seminar in May 2004, noted that "many contractors
have noticed a positive change in being able to get a[n insurance] quote -
although the pricing was prohibitive to accepting coverage."" 4
The statute is not without its detractors. Plaintiff attorney Scott Canepa
has been highly critical of Chapter 40-2003. Canepa argues that the construc-
tion industry relied too heavily on insurers to bail them out after they requested
that the Legislature create the complex matters exception in 1999.141 This, he
claims, caused insurance costs to spiral out of control when contractors began
"dumping the problems on the insurance companies and demanding they pay
133 Sylvia Hsieh, 'Right to Cure' Law Could Slow Construction Defect Claims, LAW.
WKLY, U.S.A., Sept. 29, 2003, at 14. These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, South Carolina,
Washington, and West Virginia.
134 Id. These states are Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.
135 Id. These states are Arkansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.
136 Id.
137 See Canepa, supra, note 39, at ID, 6D. See also supra text accompanying note 46
(discussing lawyer solicitation of homeowner's associations).
138 Id. at 6D.
139 Id.
140 Joe Wheeler, Construction Defect Seminar Largest of Its' [sic] Kind, CONsrRucnON
ZONE, at http://www.nvconstructionzone.com/WestCoastCasualty_CDSeminarJune_
2004%20.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
141 See Canepa, supra note 139, at 6D:
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the claims."'142 Of particular concern is that 40-2003 does not really force the
contractor to respond effectively to demands for repair. Canepa does not like
"SB 241 because it gives the builder the opportunity to make non-specific
repairs.. . If you have a crack in a wall, he can put in putty and then in two
years you'll have to do the same repairs again." 143 Canepa adds "SB241 gives
the contractor the ability to not be responsible for construction defects, instead
putting it all on the homeowner, [as opposed to a lawyer] who does not know
what is involved to correct the problems. It does a lot for the benefit of the
builder and absolutely nothing for the homeowner."
1 44
Arizona, which passed its right-to-repair statute one year before
Nevada,1 45 may also offer clues as to the new statute's future. Kevin
O'Malley, who represents Arizona homebuilders, stated in an interview in Law-
yers' Weekly USA, that his state's "Fix It"' 46 law has shown "'a positive effect'
on smaller claims." 14 7 He further maintains that "[o]ur impression right now is
that it is a useful tool and it is working where the problem is manageable, such
as one or two homes as opposed to 500 homes, or if there is one problem, such
as a stucco or soil problem, even if it affects multiple homes ....
O'Malley adds that it may take years to know "whether the statute will stave
off larger defect claims, such as a large homeowner's association with a 'laun-
dry list' of complaints."' 49 Indeed, O'Malley's concerns may be telling since
some of the most drawn out and contentious disputes in past construction defect
litigation have involved homeowner's associations that have had the resources
and resolve to wage spirited battles against homebuilders.
150
While O'Malley takes a cautious "wait and see" position, other lawyers
perceive "Fix It" statutes as failing already. Attorney Dan Bryson, who repre-
sents homeowners in the southeastern U.S., feels that builders simply won't
respond and will just wait to be sued despite these new laws. 5' Calling the
new rules "just another 'procedural hoop' for homeowners" O'Malley said that
once a general contractor is put on notice to cure a problem, he often will not
get involved until the insurance company or sub-contractors get on board.
152
California enacted a right-to-repair statute in January 2003 which is simi-
lar to Nevada's.153 Most notable is the fact that the contractor must have a
142 Id.
143 Kanigher, supra note 5, at 5D.
144 Id.
145 See generally ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-1361-1366 (2003). Arizona's law went into effect
on August 22, 2002.
146 Various articles refer to these statutes as "Fix it" laws or "Right to Cure" laws. For
purposes of this article, the "right-to-repair" will be applied. See, e.g., Hsieh, supra note 133,
at 14.
147 Hsieh, supra note 133, at 14.
148 Id. at 17.
149 Id.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 38-50 concerning the problems that resulted from
complex matters cases which often involved homeowner's association.
15' Hsieh, supra note 133, at 17.
152 Id. See also supra notes 103-110 regarding Nevada's statutory requirements when a
contractor is put on notice of a defect.
153 See generally, Hsieh, supra note 133, at 14 (discussing the major points of California's
right-to-repair statute).
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chance to repair the defect before a lawsuit can be commenced, as well as a
very specific list of what constitutes "actionable defects." '54 California attor-
ney Tom Miller, relates that homebuilders will cynically manipulate the statute
delaying the process while they prepare their defenses.1 5  For example, he
stated in a recent case he handled that "[t]he builder said 'I really want to try
and work this out. I don't want to go into litigation.' They sent experts out and
met with the [condo] board. That took six to nine months and in the end the
offer was zero. All along he was setting up his defenses." '15 6
However, another Calfornia attorney, Roger Coven, is cautiously optimis-
tic about California's law. He explains that for relatively small problems that
can be fixed easily, the statute will work well.' 5 7 Still, for more serious
defects, Coven is not as certain, stating:
[flor serious problems SB 800 [California's new right-to-repair statute] provides
builders with opportunities to solve problems before they become litigation issues. If
a builder manages to follow all of the procedures set forth in the Act, a homeowner
would be compelled to allow repairs to be made and to engage in at least a short
mediation before any action could be filed. But unless the builder is successful in
satisfying the homeowners, SB 800 may do little more than delay the inevitable.
15 8
IV. CONCLUSION
In the mid-1990s, Chapter 40-1995, although passed to manage the rising
fear of construction defect litigation, ironically made it much easier for certain
plaintiffs to file construction defect litigation against homebuilders. As a
result, the number of such cases, particularly in fast-growing Clark County,
Nevada, rose dramatically. The legislation made it especially easy for plaintiffs
to target builders of condominiums and planned unit developments because of
the exception for complex matters.
In 2003, the Nevada Legislature amended Chapter 40 to require notice and
a chance to repair for contractors and other parties, before a lawsuit could be
filed. Although opinions vary, some observers are cautiously optimistic that
the new law will begin the process of lowering the number of lawsuits, cost of
insurance, and hopefully even slow the accelerating cost of housing.
The success of the new construction defect statute, like many laws, will
depend on effective communication and the exercise of good faith and fair
dealing by both homeowners and homebuilders. Indeed, with the contractor
and similar parties now in initial control of the repair process, how these parties
react is more important than ever. Likewise, how the homeowner lists and
portrays the seriousness of the defects will have a profound effect on how the
contractor reacts. Perhaps the 2003 statute's inclusion of a more detailed defi-
nition15 9 will rein in exaggerated defect claims. However, if contractors do not
151 CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 896-897, 910 (West 2003).
155 Hsieh, supra note 133, at 17.
156 Id.
157 Roger B. Coven, California Attempts to Resolve Residential Construction Defect Claims
Without Litigation, 23 CONST. LAW 35, 36 (2003).
1" Id. at 36.
159 NEV. REv. STAT. 40.615 (2003).
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repair the defects in a reasonable and professional manner, but instead use the
time to stall and to prepare their defenses, Chapter 40-2003 will fail. If the
parties do not avail themselves of the pre-litigation remedies provided by the
statute, the lawyers will enter the fray.1 60 History has shown us that once this
happens, an even greater gulf of distrust between the parties will emerge.' 6 1
Moreover, with the elimination of the economic loss doctrine in the wake of the
Olson v. Richard case,1 62 there are greater monetary incentives for attorney
160 Proponents of Nevada's new Right-to-Repair statute might take heart by the results of a
November 2004 ballot referendum in Colorado. Amendment 34 pitted plaintiff attorneys
who sought the passage of a new constitutional provision that would have effectively over-
ruled the state's Fix-It statute, against homebuilders, insurers and others who wished to
retain the existing limits placed on construction defect litigation and damages under its
Right-to-Repair law. See Tom Ross, Voters Faced with Complex Amendment, THE STEAM-
BOAT PILOT, Oct. 14, 2004, at http://www.steamboatpilot.com/section/archive/story/26240
(last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
Amendment 34 lost by the huge margin of 77 percent to 23 percent and did not carry a
single county. See Election 2005, http://election.rockymountainnews.com/resultsissuesD
etail.cfm?issuid=2055 (last visited May 28, 2005).
The text of the amendment read as follows:
Article XVIII of the constitution of the state of Colorado is amended BY THE ADDITION OF A
NEW SECTION to read:
Section 15. Protection of property owner's right to workmanlike construction. NO LAW
SHALL LIMIT OR IMPAIR A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERS'S RIGHT
TO RECOVER DAMAGES, OTHER THAN PUNITIVE DAMAGES, CAUSED BY THE
FAILURE TO CONSTRUCT AN IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY IN A GOOD
AND WORKMANLIKE MANNER. STATUTES OF LIMITATION OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO YEARS AND STATUTES OF REPOSE OF NOT LESS THAN SIX
YEARS, AS WELL AS LAWS AFFORDING GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, SHALL
BE PERMITTED. CONSTRUCTION IN A "GOOD AND WORKMANLIKE MANNER"
SHALL INCLUDE, WITHOUT LIMITATION, CONSTRUCTION SO THAT THE
IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY IS SUITABLE FOR ITS INTENDED PUR-
POSES. THIS SECTION SHALL BE STRICTLY ENFORCED.
See Legislative Counsel Bureau of the Colorado General Assembly, Analysis of the 2004
Ballot Proposals, http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/2004/ballot/2004Bluebook
forlnternet.PDF, at 30 (last visited May 28, 2005).
161 See, e.g., Boyden, supra note 47, at 10. Boyden, a Reno, Nevada lawyer who has repre-
sented homebuilders, discusses the interaction between homeowners and homebuilders when
a construction defect is alleged to exist and how this can lead to a bitter lawsuit:
after failing to resolve issues on his or her own, the homeowner retains an attorney, who in turn
hires an expert. This expert dutifully inspects the home creating a prodigious list of defects -
many of which were not known to the homeowner, or even considered a problem by the home-
owners - nor do they present any danger to the homeowner. This long list then makes its way to
the contractor via a transmittal letter from the homeowner attorney. This letter contains the usual
verbiage about requiring immediate repair of all these tremendous defects, and if not, the con-
tractor will be saddled with significant repair costs, loss in value of the home costs, payment of
attorney's fees, payment of court cost, and of course payment of all expert fees. Normally, this
letter catches the contractor completely off guard. Although potentially imprudent, the contrac-
tor often reacts emotionally and defensively (i.e., quite human) and dismisses this written
onslaught by the homeowner as offensive. Chapter 40 thus commences. The consequences of
this initial unpleasant encounter are dire. Through this initial procedure, any potentially real
defects have been washed away by the created defects. The huge list forces the parties to
"square off" and retreat into their respective corners. Any ability to negotiate over the true issues
in the case terminates; Chapter 40 procedures have effectively polarized the parties.
s.162 Olson v. Richards, 89 P.3d 31 (Nev. 2004).
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involvement. The end result may be action for negligent contraction, among
other tort theories, seeking ever-greater consequential damages.
To the extent the law aims to amicably resolve construction defect dis-
putes, Nevadans should wish for the new law's success. Growth has brought
prosperity not seen in Nevada since the Comstock gold rush. Whether the
"good-times" continue for Southern Nevada may very well hang on the success
of Chapter 40-2003.
